Thirty years after opening for signature, the CTBT has broad international support but still lacks nine ratifications required for entry into force
By Ramesh Jaura
BERLIN | 15 November 2026 (IDN) — Kazakhstan and Japan have renewed calls for an end to nuclear testing as the treaty intended to prohibit all nuclear explosions remains blocked, three decades after it opened for signature.
Their appeal, made at a September commemoration at the United Nations Office at Nairobi, comes as preparations for enforcing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) continue despite the political impasse. An inspection exercise in Namibia is testing capabilities that cannot be used under the treaty until it enters into force.
The contrast exposes a central weakness in the international effort to prevent renewed testing: governments have built a global detection network, but have yet to activate the agreement that would authorise inspectors to investigate a suspected violation on the ground.
According to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), 188 countries have signed the treaty and 179 have ratified it. Those numbers are insufficient under its entry-into-force provisions, which require ratification by every one of 44 states listed in its Annex 2.
Nine ratifications are still missing: those of China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and the United States.
Nine countries hold the key
The treaty opened for signature on 24 September 1996. It prohibits nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, including those described as having peaceful purposes.
Its Annex 2 requirement covers countries that participated in the negotiations and possessed nuclear power or research reactors at the time. It was designed to bring states with relevant nuclear capabilities into the agreement before the prohibition became binding under the treaty.
That provision also means that each outstanding ratification can prevent entry into force, regardless of how many other countries join.
India, North Korea and Pakistan have not signed. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the United States have signed but not ratified. Russia ratified in 2000, then revoked its ratification in November 2023 while remaining a signatory.
The distinction between support for a testing moratorium and acceptance of a treaty obligation is consequential. A moratorium depends on a government’s continued political commitment. Entry into force would establish the treaty’s binding prohibition for its parties and allow its full verification arrangements to operate.
The CTBT would not require the dismantling of existing nuclear arsenals. Nor would it prohibit every activity associated with maintaining or modernising them. Its specific purpose is to prevent nuclear explosions, closing off a method historically used to develop weapons and demonstrate their performance.
Those limits help explain both its broad support and the persistence of the dispute. Agreement on ending explosive testing has proved easier to express than agreement on accepting the legal obligations and inspection arrangements intended to secure that end.
Detection without inspection powers
The CTBTO’s International Monitoring System already supplies data from facilities using four technologies: seismic sensors, hydroacoustic instruments, infrasound detectors and radionuclide monitoring.
Together, they look for underground disturbances, sound travelling through water, low-frequency waves in the atmosphere and radioactive material that can help identify a nuclear explosion. The technologies complement one another; a seismic signal alone does not establish that an event was nuclear.
The network detected North Korea’s September 2017 test. Monitoring data also have civilian applications, including support for tsunami warnings and scientific research.
On-site inspection would add a different kind of evidence. Inspectors could examine a designated area for physical indications of a nuclear explosion, using procedures set out in the treaty. Such an inspection would require approval through the treaty’s decision-making machinery; it would not follow automatically from a suspicious signal.
Until entry into force, however, that mechanism remains unavailable.
The CTBTO has scheduled its third large-scale integrated inspection exercise in Namibia for October and November, with completion planned for 20 November. Earlier exercises of this scale took place in Kazakhstan in 2008 and Jordan in 2014.
The exercise is intended to test how personnel, equipment and inspection procedures work together in realistic conditions. Its practical significance lies in maintaining readiness for a legal authority that states have yet to bring into operation.
For governments assessing a suspected test, the present arrangements therefore offer substantial monitoring capacity but an incomplete means of resolving disputes over what happened at the site.
The legacy behind the appeal
The Nairobi commemoration brought diplomats, survivors and UN officials together to discuss the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons use and testing, according to a UN account published on 3 September.
It marked 35 years since the closure of Kazakhstan’s Semipalatinsk test site, 81 years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and 20 years since the signing of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaty.
Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to Kenya, Barlybay Sadykov, stressed the suffering of families and communities affected by testing. Japan’s Ambassador, Hiroshi Matsuura, described Semipalatinsk’s closure as “an act of extraordinary courage”.
The experiences recalled at the meeting have different origins: weapons testing in Kazakhstan and nuclear attacks on Japanese cities. Both have informed the two countries’ diplomatic support for ending nuclear explosions.
The Soviet Union conducted 456 nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk between 1949 and 1989. Atmospheric testing exposed surrounding populations and land to radioactive fallout. The site closed on 29 August 1991, before Kazakhstan became independent later that year.
Kazakhstan subsequently relinquished the nuclear arsenal left on its territory after the Soviet Union’s dissolution. Its campaign against testing also helped establish 29 August as the International Day against Nuclear Tests through a UN General Assembly resolution adopted in 2009.
Closing a test site does not end the consequences of its use. Radiation exposure, contaminated land and restrictions on livelihoods can leave affected communities dependent on health services, environmental monitoring and public assistance for decades.
For Japan, testimony from the hibakusha — survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings — has kept civilian suffering prominent in international nuclear debate. The Nairobi event connected that testimony with the experience of communities affected by testing.
A wider diplomatic setback
The test-ban impasse forms part of a broader deterioration in nuclear diplomacy.
On 22 May, the 2026 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ended without agreement on a substantive outcome. UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed disappointment at the failure to reach consensus.
It followed unsuccessful attempts to agree substantive final documents at the 2015 and 2022 review conferences.
The NPT links commitments to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons with obligations to pursue disarmament negotiations and provisions for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Repeated disagreement over implementation leaves those obligations in place, but makes it harder for states to agree how to advance them.
The CTBT presents a narrower question. Its verification arrangements have been developed over decades, and its prohibition concerns one identifiable activity. Yet the outstanding Annex 2 ratifications remain beyond the reach of the treaty’s supporters.
That gives the deadlock significance beyond testing itself. It shows the difficulty of converting widespread diplomatic endorsement into an operative agreement when entry into force depends on states with conflicting security interests.
Another treaty, different obligations
The next major meeting on nuclear disarmament will be the first Review Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, scheduled for 30 November to 4 December at UN Headquarters in New York, under South Africa’s presidency.
That treaty goes considerably further than the CTBT. For its parties, it prohibits the development, testing, production, possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also provides for assistance to victims and environmental remediation.
The two agreements address related problems through different obligations. The prohibition treaty seeks to outlaw nuclear weapons as a category. The CTBT seeks to end nuclear explosions, including by countries that retain nuclear arsenals.
Progress under the prohibition treaty does not remove the CTBT’s entry-into-force requirement. Nor can additional ratifications from countries outside Annex 2 compensate for those still missing from the nine named states.
For Kazakhstan and Japan, the Nairobi appeal keeps the human consequences of nuclear explosions before governments. For the CTBTO, work in Namibia develops the capacity to investigate them. Bringing those efforts together in an enforceable treaty still depends on decisions in the nine capitals whose ratifications are outstanding. (IDN-InDepthNews)