The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Fifth Plenum, held on October 26–29, offered important insights into General Secretary Xi Jinping’s evolving system of political control. Its decision on “comprehensive and strict party governance” underscores how the institutionalization of continuous political rectification has become a hallmark of Xi’s rule.
The Fifth Plenum is significant for three reasons. First, it consolidates “Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building” (XJTPB) as an authoritative framework for CCP governance. Second, it embeds continuous political rectification within the party’s governing institutions. Third, it exposes an unresolved tension between the party’s enhanced capacity to punish misconduct and the continuation of problems of political reliability, information distortion, and delegated authority.
Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building
The plenum’s communiqué identified XJTPB as an authoritative component of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” Its core contribution is to address what the CCP regards as the fundamental question of “how to build a long-term ruling Marxist party” capable of maintaining its monopoly on political power indefinitely.
XJTPB’s answer to this question is that the “political construction” of party members must take precedence over all else. This entails that all party members “uphold the party’s nature and purpose” by “strengthening ideals and beliefs” and “forging loyalty to the party.” Only in this way can party members “be loyal, clean, and responsible.” Political reliability thus becomes the indispensable qualification for advancement and the exercise of authority by party cadres.
Yet political reliability is not enough. Rather, the CCP and its individual members must be committed to “self-revolution” through the continual identification and correction of political, ideological, organizational, and disciplinary weaknesses.
This approach has historical antecedents in Mao Zedong’s Yan’an rectification movement, which linked the forging of ideological conformity and organizational discipline to the consolidation of Mao’s undisputed leadership. Unlike Mao’s subsequent episodic campaigns, however, Xi arguably seeks to institutionalize rectification as a permanent feature of party governance. Indeed, the CCP, the communique exhorted, must continually “turn the blade inward” to identify and eliminate threats arising from within its own ranks.
“Self-revolution” however also reflects a broader concern with political survival. As Neil Thomas and Shengyu Wang have argued, Xi’s interpretation of the rise and fall of Chinese dynasties and the collapse of the Soviet Union stresses the danger that even powerful ruling organizations can succumb to corruption, complacency, and internal decay. Thus, the communique explicitly identified the party’s capacity for “self-purification, self-renewal, and self-enhancement” as fundamental to its ability to “break free from the historical cycle of governance and chaos.”
XJTPB therefore does more than legitimize Xi’s authority as it supplies the normative foundations for treating supervision, discipline, and ideological correction as permanent requirements of party governance.
The Institutionalization of Rectification
The communique listed three priorities for translating these principles into institutional practice: tighter management and supervision of officials; stronger party organizations throughout the governance hierarchy; and integration of disciplinary enforcement, behavioral correction and anti-corruption measures.
These measures correspond to what the communique identified as an “integrated” formula for party governance of “not daring to be corrupt, not being able to be corrupt, not wanting to be corrupt.” In essence, proper discipline, organizational monitoring, and cultivation of party cadres will mean that individuals will always fear punishment for improper behavior (“not daring to be corrupt”), have less opportunity for deviance through organizational monitoring (“not being able to be corrupt”), and ultimately have moral barriers to malfeasance through the ideological transformation of “self-revolution” (“not wanting to be corrupt”).
The objective is therefore not simply to punish corruption but to reshape the institutional conditions under which officials exercise authority.
Yet this ambition exposes a fundamental problem. How can a centralized leadership ensure that subordinate officials reliably implement its directives while providing accurate information and exercising sufficient initiative to govern effectively?
This is a classic principal-agent dilemma. Leaders must delegate authority to subordinates whose actions and motivations they cannot fully observe. While greater supervision may discourage misconduct, it may not eliminate information asymmetries or guarantee political reliability. Indeed, in the context of the contemporary CCP, such scrutiny has encouraged bureaucratic caution, excessive conformity, and the concealment of politically inconvenient information
The CCP therefore confronts a potential contradiction between maximizing political discipline and encouraging the initiative, adaptability, and accurate reporting required for effective governance. The resulting tension is therefore not between control and an absence of control. It is between different requirements of effective rule.
The PLA and the Paradox of Political Control
The continuing purges within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) illustrate this dilemma particularly clearly.
Senior officers have faced allegations involving corruption, manipulation of procurement and personnel appointments, and breaches of party discipline. Such practices have persisted in the PLA despite its extensive political supervision through party committees, political commissars, disciplinary inspection, and centralized personnel management.
The purges demonstrate Xi’s willingness and capacity to sanction even the military’s most senior figures. Yet their recurrence also raises questions about the preventive effectiveness of existing mechanisms of political control. They reveal both the coercive strength of the system and its potential limitations in preventing misconduct before it occurs.
Crucially, the capacity to identify and punish misconduct after the fact is not equivalent to ensuring reliable compliance beforehand.
The Fifth Plenum therefore represents more than another reaffirmation of Xi’s authority. It consolidates a governing system in which permanent political rectification is central to the CCP’s conception of organizational survival. Yet the communiqué’s repeated insistence on loyalty, discipline, and supervision also points to the persistence of the very vulnerabilities Xi’s reforms seek to eliminate.
The paradox of Xi’s political control system is that stronger mechanisms of punishment may demonstrate the coercive power of centralized authority without resolving the underlying problems of political reliability and organizational effectiveness.