China’s view of NATO has not changed for years. In Beijing the alliance is seen as a remnant of the Cold War that should have been dissolved after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the same way as the Warsaw Pact. Like Russia, China does not see NATO as a defensive alliance but rather as an offensive one that threatens global stability. Examples of this include its successive eastward enlargements, and NATO’s so-called out-of-area interventions. In this regard, Beijing often refers to NATO’s (accidental) bombardment of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during the intervention in the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Beijing shares Moscow’s perception that NATO’s enlargements toward the East exert pressure on Russia by ignoring its security concerns. Thus China shares the view that NATO is to blame for Moscow’s preemptive military actions (such as in Ukraine), which are seen as acts of self-defense.
In the Chinese perception the inclusion of China on the NATO agenda – first in 2019 and then in the Strategic Concept in 2022 – suggests that the organization is preparing to expand into Asia, or that there is a plan to establish an “Asian NATO.” Therefore, in Beijing’s eyes, Russia now plays the role of a buffer zone between NATO and the Asia-Pacific region. Without this buffer, Chinese analysts believe, NATO would already be present in Asia, posing a serious security threat to China.
No matter how strange and exaggerated NATO finds the Chinese perspective on the alliance, the organization should not ignore it and should consider addressing Chinese concerns. Even if China does not truly believe in NATO’s expansions to Asia and is merely using this as a political tool – for example, an excuse to support Russia in its war against Ukraine and express its negative feelings toward the West – it would still be worthwhile for NATO to consider whether it is actually helpful for the alliance to use its forum to discuss China.
It is widely known that the idea of putting China on NATO’s agenda originated in the United States. It is no coincidence that China was first mentioned within the NATO framework during Donald Trump’s first term as U.S. president. It is also common knowledge that European allies were (and still are) reluctant to focus on China within the NATO framework for three main reasons. First, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made it clear that Russia, not China, is an imminent security threat to the alliance.
Second, NATO, which is based on the Washington Treaty, operates within the geographical area specified in the document. Article 6 refers to the “North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer” as NATO’s area of activities.
Third, China is perceived in Europe as a challenge, or even a threat, but mostly an economic one, rather than a (direct) hard security one, even when its support for Russia is considered. It is also well known that the fact that China is still seen by NATO as a “challenge” rather than a “threat” (see the NATO Strategic Concept wording) is thanks to the European allies who have been trying to curb U.S. demands and reduce China’s importance to the alliance.
I would argue that making China a topic of discussion for NATO would be counterproductive for the alliance. First, it would reinforce or validate Beijing’s real or imagined concerns about the organization expanding into Asia. Even though NATO is geographically restricted, China uses the fact that it is part of the Strategic Concept to highlight that the alliance is expanding toward Asia and poses a real threat to Beijing.
NATO constantly explains that it does not intend to have a presence in Asia because this would contradict the Washington Treaty. The only thing it is considering is exchanging views with the “Indo-Pacific Four” (IP4) and other Asian countries on the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region, with a focus on cyber issues, etc. However, China does not believe this is true.
China also does not accept NATO’s explanation that when U.S., French, British, German, or other vessels conduct freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in Asia, they are not NATO ships. These operations are carried out on a country-by-country basis without any “blessing” from NATO. China is eager to exploit these FONOPS as political tools against the West, and it’s easy to do so. Few distinguish between NATO operations and national ships when it is simpler to put them all into the NATO basket. And China just does that.
Finally, discussing China within the context of NATO is a noticeable diversion of attention from the real threat to the alliance – that is Russia.
There are quite a few other formats in which China as a hard security actor could be discussed instead of NATO. The European Union seems to be the best option, when it comes to the European countries, at least. The EU has been discussing China not only in terms of its economic challenges and threats, such as deindustrialization, which could result in job losses and social instability in Europe, but also in terms of hard security. There are many examples of the EU taking a harder stance on China to defend Europe. China poses a hard security threat to Europe due to its support for Russia, resulting in Chinese companies being added to the EU’s sanction packages against Russia, albeit in small numbers. China could also be discussed in both bilateral and multilateral formats such as transatlantic discussions, talks with ASEAN and its members, the G7, and others.
Continuing to discuss China in the NATO format may reinforce Beijing’s negative perception of the organization, significantly reducing the scope for potential cooperation with Beijing in order to mitigate threats to NATO from such China’s political friends as Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Rather than arguing that China poses a challenge to the alliance, it would be better to engage in regular dialogue with Beijing and try to convince China – although this would be no easy task – to soften its negative opinion of NATO. The alliance should emphasize that NATO’s existence benefits China by deterring Russia from starting a war with NATO allies that could be catastrophic for China.