On September 15, the Bangladeshi government announced the dissolution of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), a unit accused for two decades of killings, torture, and enforced disappearances. It was immediately replaced with the Special Response Battalion, or SRB. One month later, 50 Bangladeshi soldiers left Dhaka for Haiti as the advance team for a U.N.-authorized force to participate in the ongoing Gang Suppression Force.
For years, officers who had served in the RAB, even those with a horrifying human rights record, were sent abroad as U.N. peacekeepers. Has that route now been closed?
To answer briefly: No. Although the name on the door has changed, the door is still open.
Bangladesh has sent peacekeepers abroad since 1988 and was the top troop contributor from 2021 to 2023. According to current Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman, Bangladesh has earned about 8.62 billion taka (roughly $73 million) in foreign currency from peacekeeping in fiscal year 2023-24 alone. Apart from allowances that go to the peacekeepers themselves, rent for Bangladeshi equipment goes to the treasury. Over 23 fiscal years through 2022-23, the Bangladeshi armed forces earned 279.41 billion taka this way, and they were often deployed to well-paid U.N. missions after their time in the RAB.
The RAB was formed in 2004, under a Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government, with officers on loan from the army, navy, air force, and police. The battalion was embroiled in several major crimes, as documented by the Bangladesh courts. In 2014, seven people were abducted and murdered in Narayanganj. In connection with the case, a court sentenced 16 RAB members to death for their involvement. Nevertheless, the crimes continued and resulted in sanctions by the United States in 2021, with Washington citing allegations of more than 600 disappearances since 2009.
After Sheikh Hasina was ousted in August 2024, a Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances looked at what had been hidden by her Awami League government. It reviewed 1,569 complaints of enforced disappearances and found RAB implicated in about a quarter of them. It found prima facie evidence against 82 officers, including 40 from the RAB and 11 from the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence, or DGFI, the military’s intelligence agency. At one RAB site, the commission’s inspectors found a bricked-over entrance to cells too small for a prisoner to lie down. In October 2025, prosecutors charged 28 people, 23 of them serving or retired army officers, over disappearances and torture in two interrogation cells, one run by RAB and one by DGFI.
The abuses did not stop when the government changed. According to the rights group Odhikar, at least 40 extrajudicial killings took place in the first 14 months of the interim government, led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus. In January 2025, Towhidul Islam, a BNP youth leader, died hours after a joint force detained him, with marks of torture on his body. According to another rights group, Ain o Salish Kendra, 11 extrajudicial killings were recorded in the first half of 2026 under the newly elected BNP government.
With Bangladesh among the countries sending the most U.N. peacekeepers abroad, what is more worrying is that the officers implicated in abuses at home can be deployed to international missions and could repeat the same abuses abroad, against the very people they are sent to protect.
In 2019, the U.N. Committee Against Torture said it was concerned that people who had served in the RAB were frequently deployed on U.N. peacekeeping missions. In May 2024, DW reported that more than 100 RAB officers had gone on peacekeeping missions, 40 of them after the U.N. warning. Three had worked in RAB’s Intelligence Wing, which the report said ran secret torture cells. Two had been its deputy directors. The army’s press office called the report “false and fallacious” and claimed a spotless record abroad. However, according to the U.N.’s own records, Bangladeshi personnel had been found responsible in four substantiated cases of sexual exploitation and abuse, with children among the victims. In one incident, two Bangladeshi soldiers raped a minor in the Central African Republic.
With the overthrow of the Awami League government, many would have thought things might change for good, but little has changed in this regard.
Three things have kept this route open for officers accused of abuse, despite the change of government and promises to reform the security forces.
The first is the people. RAB officers were on loan. When their tours ended, they went back to the army, navy, air force, or police, the forces that supply peacekeepers. Renaming the unit does nothing about the individuals. For those still serving, the SRB Act moved all of RAB’s manpower, powers, funds, and records to the new force. According to Transparency International Bangladesh, without fundamental reforms and independent oversight, the newly announced force could replicate RAB’s powers and culture. Transparency International Bangladesh recommended that every officer be vetted before any transfer. Instead, serving RAB personnel simply became SRB members, and military officers can still be posted to the renamed unit.
The second is weak oversight of Bangladesh’s security forces. According to Human Rights Watch, the U.N. systematically screened only the senior army ranks and left the rest to Bangladesh’s National Human Rights Commission. In 2025, the interim government brought the National Human Rights Commission into compliance with the Paris Principles, the U.N. standards for independent and effective national human rights institutions, and empowered it to investigate public officials, including members of the security forces, without prior government approval. However, the BNP government repealed the ordinance and restored the 2009 law, which prevents the commission from investigating the security forces.
The third is the U.N. system itself. The first two stages for a candidate to be accepted for a U.N. peacekeeping mission are that the officer certifies that he is clean, and this is then followed by the officer’s government. The U.N. human rights office then checks what it can. According to Human Rights Watch, governments that deny or cover up abuses by their forces cannot meet that standard.
In 2025, the U.N. human rights office proposed that Bangladesh build an independent screening mechanism; until then, it should not nominate anyone involved with the RAB or DGFI to peacekeeping missions. Months later, the U.N.’s resident coordinator in Dhaka was still saying such a mechanism “must” be established. Neither Dhaka nor the U.N. Department of Peace Operations has announced whether such a mechanism exists.
In November 2025, U.N. experts warned the Department of Peace Operations about the involvement of Bangladeshi military officials in alleged human rights violations against Indigenous people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and wrote to the department to ask whether these allegations were considered when selecting peacekeepers. The experts warned that sending officers linked to serious abuses could endanger civilians and undermine trust in U.N. missions. The fact that U.N. experts were still asking how officers were screened raised further doubts about whether the promised independent screening mechanism had been put in place.
That uncertainty is troubling as Bangladesh plans to send roughly 1,600 soldiers and police to Haiti. The U.N.-authorized Gang Suppression Force operates under national flags and a command outside the U.N., with authority to conduct operations independently of Haitian police. U.N. human rights safeguards still apply, but their enforcement matters. Without credible, independent screening, officers implicated in abuses could gain broad powers over people already suffering from gang violence.
This needs to stop, and in fact it should have stopped years ago. In the past, the U.N. declined to replace Burundian police units in the Central African Republic because of abuses in Burundi. Similarly, in 2019, it suspended Sri Lankan army deployments with peacekeeping, with limited exceptions, after a general accused of war crimes became army chief. However, Bangladesh’s grave human rights violations were never addressed with the same seriousness. At least 2,597 Bangladeshis were killed by security forces between 2009 and 2022, and hundreds more were taken and never came back. Even though U.N. experts kept writing warnings about the situation, the U.N. went on taking Bangladeshi troops and paying for them.
In June 2023, the U.N. peacekeeping chief visited Dhaka as a state guest while many human rights groups urged him to bar the RAB from peacekeeping missions. Their requests went without a formal reply.
On the one hand, for decades the U.N. has documented a serious human rights crisis in Bangladesh, including repeated cases of forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings linked to the RAB, and on the other hand, the U.N. has paid the very institutions responsible for that crisis to keep the peace elsewhere.
When a U.N. inquiry finds that a country’s forces have carried out systematic killings, torture, or disappearances, new deployments from that country should stop until independent vetting is in place, with full access for the U.N. and national human rights staff. That should be the rule for every country.
The old excuse was that the U.N. needed the troops. It is now short on money and has been sending thousands of peacekeepers home, including more than 1,300 Bangladeshis. Bangladesh’s new government has the opportunity to initiate real change. It can vet the officers it moved into the SRB and give its rights commission the power to investigate them. Until then, the Haitian people deserve to know who is being sent to protect them. Families already terrorized by gangs should not have to fear the forces sent to keep them safe.