More mines don’t always mean more resilience


‘Everybody wants to rule the world,’ Tears for Fears told us in 1985. Four decades later, the race to secure critical minerals suggests that everybody also wants to control their own supply chains. But as I was reminded at the International Mining and Resources Conference (IMARC) in Sydney last month, individual countries can become more secure while the international markets that they depend on become more fragmented.

Measures to achieve security by some countries therefore diminish it for others.

IMARC brings together miners, investors, manufacturers and governments, all of whom make decisions that shape where minerals are processed and who can buy them. I attended to facilitate a critical minerals discussion and deliver a keynote on sovereign downstream processing. Several conversations there challenged my assumptions.

I had worried that markets were responding too slowly to concentrated supply chains. Some participants argued convincingly that alternative suppliers were emerging and that shortages in certain commodities were overstated. What became apparent was that their confidence didn’t necessarily allay national security concerns. Industry can reasonably conclude that markets are adapting, and at the same time governments can remain concerned about access during disruption. Both assessments can be right because they’re measuring different things.

The distinction becomes clearer when resilience is considered in terms of existence and durability of supply and access to it in a crisis. A new refinery might provide an alternative source of supply today, but whether it survives a prolonged downturn depends on commercial conditions. Even if it does, there’s no guarantee that its production will remain accessible during a geopolitical crisis. Increasing the number of suppliers only partly addresses the problem.

Developing processing capacity takes years and requires proven technology, substantial finance and customers prepared to qualify new products. Higher prices encourage investment, but when markets turn, new projects are often the first to struggle. Governments have responded by increasing financial support for these projects.

The International Energy Agency reports that public finance commitments for critical minerals in advanced economies reached about US$65 billion (A$92 billion) in 2025, more than four times their 2023 level. Yet investment by major critical minerals companies declined 9 percent that year. These measures aren’t directly comparable, but they show the limits of public ambition when commercial conditions remain difficult.

The problem isn’t simply a shortage of finance. Processing facilities need bankable demand, with purchasing commitments that are sufficiently credible and durable to support investment. Manufacturers may welcome the security of a second supplier while continuing to purchase from cheaper incumbents. When prices fall, somebody has to pay to keep that alternative available, otherwise the capacity developed to improve resilience may disappear before it’s needed.

This tension surfaced in discussions at IMARC about Defence. Some industry participants saw military procurement as a potential source of demand for strategically important minerals, an understandable expectation given the reliance of advanced weapons systems on specialised materials. But Defence’s dependence on a mineral can be far greater than its share of the market. Rare earth magnets, for example, are essential to some military systems, yet civilian demand from vehicles, electronics and industrial equipment is much larger. Defence procurement alone cannot sustain an entire processing and manufacturing industry.

That doesn’t leave government without options. It can underwrite some demand, share qualification costs or pay a premium for assured supply where the security benefits justify the expense. More importantly, it can bring civilian manufacturers, processors and investors together across several countries to establish the commercial demand needed to sustain alternative suppliers. The objective isn’t to insulate every strategically important project from competition but to make investments viable where the wider security benefits are not adequately reflected in market prices.

Once governments begin organising supply around national security requirements, however, another problem emerges. Consider the United States. New American processing facilities could create substantial demand for Australian raw materials and provide opportunities for our miners. Yet if purchasing arrangements reserve much of that production for American manufacturers, global processing becomes more geographically diverse without necessarily becoming more accessible to partner countries.

The distinction between national supply-security and international resilience is consequential for Australia. A country can reduce its own exposure without reducing the vulnerability faced by its partners, and preferential access may simply redistribute risk. Competing national subsidies could also create facilities operating below commercial scale, while apparently separate supply chains continue relying on the same technologies or intermediate processors. More investment and more facilities don’t automatically translate into a market that’s better able to withstand disruption.

Australia’s opportunity extends beyond protecting existing market access. Countries seeking assured supply represent potential customers for our mining, processing and industrial expertise. Their willingness to pay for greater security could support investments that Australia’s domestic market cannot sustain. But capturing that demand requires Australia to engage with the industrial strategies of its partners before investment and purchasing decisions become locked into arrangements that exclude other suppliers.

That suggests a different approach to critical minerals diplomacy. Rather than separately negotiating investment, security cooperation and market access, Australia should pursue arrangements that connect them. Joint purchasing commitments could help new facilities achieve scale, while shared qualification arrangements could reduce the cost of switching suppliers. Agreements should also establish how production would be allocated during disruption, when governments may be tempted to prioritise domestic requirements over international commitments.

None of this means that every strategic vulnerability requires an Australian refinery. Stockpiles, overseas processing, diversified purchasing and selective domestic capacity address different risks, and government support should reflect the specific security benefit being purchased. The test is whether an intervention preserves access and industrial capability through changing commercial and geopolitical conditions, rather than simply adding another facility to the global production map.

I left IMARC more optimistic about markets’ capacity to adapt, but less willing to equate new production with lasting resilience. The danger is that governments secure their own supplies while weakening the international markets on which their partners depend.



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