Regulatory Capture In Malaysian Health Care


George J Stigler was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1982 for his “seminal studies of industrial structures, functioning of markets and causes and effects of public regulation”

Stigler’s “The Theory of Economic Regulation” was published in the Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science. He wrote that “A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit”.

This can be explained in easily understood terms by imagining that the government is considering passing or imposing certain regulations or policies and about its enforcement and interpretations.

The question is who has the incentive to expend large amounts of money, time and attention focused on every clause of these regulations or policies, day in and day out.

Stigler pointed out that politics and behind-the-scenes lobbying will play a big role in this process. Over time, those directly affected by regulation or policy will have a strong incentive to play a prominent role in shaping the regulations or policy.

Regulatory Capture Mechanisms

Regulatory capture can occur through financial incentives, career mobility, and intellectual influence. However, its pathways are subtler, diffuse and more varied than most people assume.

Regulatory capture has been facilitated by politics. Politicians support their campaigns through donations in many countries. This practice enables various groups to engage in lobbying and pursuance of rent-seeking activities.

Some health care suppliers aim to obtain favourable conditions from policymakers. They may directly influence regulations or policies that not only benefit their own interests but also put their competitors at a disadvantage.

Since the regulated possess informational advantages, they are more likely to act opportunistically. They can transmit self-serving information when regulators outsource expertise to them to develop standards, compliance and audit requirements, and taxonomy rules, e.g. defining what is “green”, etc, which raises barriers for new entrants and protects incumbents.

A common pathway is the revolving door where there is movement of personnel from regulatory agencies to and from the industries the agencies regulate. This can lead to conflicts of interest.

When regulators leave a regulatory agency for positions in regulated private sector companies, it raises questions about the integrity of their prior oversight or vice versa. Revolving doors transform independent oversight into a collaborative partnership.

Another pathway is that of cultural or cognitive capture which is subtle and insidious. The ostensible informal relationships between regulators and various stakeholders, where a particular worldview is subtly ingrained, ultimately leads to more favourable regulations or policies.

The funding of select scientific studies, and the inclusion of lobbyists on scientific and ethics committees, serves to sway decision makers. An example is the United States’ U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) relationship with the pharmaceutical industry, where user fees, paid by the industry to fund the review of new drug applications, generates a majority of the FDA’s Human Drugs programme budget.

The expansion of regulatory power through “mission creep” with the raising of new threats or issues that need to be regulated, is another bureaucratic growth strategy.

The increase in regulatory complexity not only benefits bureaucracies but also benefits the private entities that capitalise on it.

Politicians can also capture regulation to reinforce their power. Political entrepreneurs can threaten others with regulation to extract rents.

The public ultimately bears the costs of regulatory capture. As it is not a large amount when spread out per person, this creates a strong disincentive for the public to counter-lobby.

Compared to the public, organised lobbies have far lower organisational costs relatively.

United States

Genevieve Kanter and Daniel Carpenter’s article “Revolving Door In Health Care Regulation” reviewed the appointments to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the health care regulator in the US between 2004 and 2020.

They found that 15 per cent had been employed in the private industry immediately before their appointment. At the end of their tenure, 32 per cent exited to industry.

The greatest net exits to industry were from the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Centres for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The HHS offices with the highest rates of net exits to industry, i.e. exits minus entries, included the CDC, the Office of the Deputy Secretary, the CMS, and the FDA.

At the CDC, although only 8 per cent of appointees came from industry, 54 per cent exited to industry positions, resulting in a net exit rate of 46 percentage points. More than half of the appointees at the CDC, CMS, and the Office of the Deputy Secretary exited to industry.

The authors concluded “The sheer scale of the revolving door that we have identified, however, is troubling and merits further scrutiny. The risks posed to the functioning of and public trust in HHS warrants study into how these government-industry flows are affecting agency decision making, especially in offices with the highest net exit rates.

“Where there exist vulnerabilities, analysis can focus on how current laws and regulations can be refined or better enforced. Given the complexity and subtlety of mechanisms of industry influence, regulation of the revolving door will require innovative legal and regulatory strategies.”

India

Access to medicines has been an issue in India with regulatory capture in the domestic market. The mechanisms concern the regulation of medicine prices, which was prey to industry influence; regulation of the therapeutic relevance of drugs; and the regulation of clinical trials.

A study by Oxfam India entitled “Regulatory Capture And Access To Healthcare: India Case Study” and published in 2017, showed how instances of regulatory capture was embedded in the economic system.

The authors concluded that regulatory capture by the industry “both domestic and foreign, has largely nullified the possible benefits of regulations of the medicines market.

“Regulatory capture in India is also exercised at the level of public policy with the adoption of neoliberal reforms which places the interest of industry over public health.

“The impact of neoliberal reforms also extends to continued stagnation of investment in public health, thus compounding the problem of compromised access to medicines for poor patients.”

Malaysia

Is Malaysian health care any different?

The columnist recalls a discussion with a previous health director-general in the 1990s, who informed that it was a rule then that senior government officials could not take up positions in the private sector in the fields they had been regulating, for some years after retirement.

Since then, there have been instances where senior government health care officials join the private sector not long after retirement, especially in the pharmaceutical industry.

The two largest initial public offerings (IPOs), in 2026, in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange are health care companies. Previous senior officials of the Ministry of Health (MOH) were listed as directors in the prospectuses of both companies.

The delisting of nicotine from the Poison List is another issue. The Kuala Lumpur High Court ruled, in May 2026, that the delisting of nicotine from the Poison List in 2023 by then health minister Dr Zaliha Mustafa, against the advice of the then Poisons Board, was illegal.

The government withdrew its appeal to the Court of Appeal. Yet the current Poisons Board was reported to have endorsed the delisting of nicotine at the reported request of the current minister, Dzulkefly Ahmad.

It is inevitable that the medical community have raised questions about the integrity of governmental oversight. Were governmental decisions made in the public interest? Or were governmental decisions in the public interest not made when they should have been made?

Ethical And Moral Questions

These questions of regulatory capture include:

  • Fairness: How can regulators be fair to all stakeholders, particularly the public, if they are influenced by the interests of those whom they have to regulate?
  • Accountability: How can regulators be held accountable for actions that do not protect the public interest if they are obligated to those whom they regulate?
  • Transparency: How can interactions between regulators and industry be transparent to maintain public trust and prevent corruption?
  • Public trust: How can the public trust the government when regulations or policies are perceived to favour special interests?
  • Governmental action: How can regulatory bodies be designed to include institutional safeguards and transparency mechanisms to insulate regulators from undue political or financial influence so that public trust is protected?

The consequences of regulatory capture are diminished safety standards, higher health care costs, and reduced access to care.

Patients may be exposed to defective or dangerous medicines and/or medical devices; delayed or denied treatments, and increased insurance premiums. It also undermines public trust in health care facilities and government agencies.

Regulatory capture can be reduced by structural safeguards, like ensuring independence of the regulator or policymaker, transparent decision-making, and simplified regulatory and policy frameworks that limit external influence.

The strengthening of oversight, strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules, limiting revolving door employment, and ensuring transparency in research funding are also crucial.

The reader can decide on the applicability in Malaysia of a major theme in the US mid-term elections, i.e. whether watchdogs can be allowed to become lapdogs.

Dr Milton Lum is a Past President of the Federation of Private Medical Associations, Malaysia and the Malaysian Medical Association. This article is not intended to replace, dictate or define evaluation by a qualified doctor. The views expressed do not represent that of any organisation the writer is associated with.

  • This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of CodeBlue.

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