Northeast Risk is Real Despite Distant Scam Hubs


A homemaker in Champhai, a town on the Mizoram side of the India–Myanmar border, held a bank account that received Rs 15.48 crore. Her family’s income was about Rs 27,000 a month. According to India’s Enforcement Directorate (ED), the federal agency that investigates money laundering, her account was one of many used to move cash from drug sales back to suppliers across the frontier.

My argument is this. On the evidence available, Myanmar’s militia-protected scam economy has not yet set up on India’s side of the border. But the Northeast is already tied into the money and supply chains that sustain it. Treating that link as a distant, Southeast Asian concern would be a mistake. New Delhi should act on the plumbing now rather than wait for compounds to appear in Mizoram.

The ED’s October case shows the mechanics. Coordinated searches in Mizoram and Manipur led to six arrests, the freezing of 1,424 bank accounts and assets worth Rs 26.01 crore provisionally attached. The agency calls the border a “two-way street”: precursor chemicals move into Myanmar, while finished heroin and methamphetamine tablets come back through the Champhai-Zokhawthar sector. In the ED’s account, the chemical supply, the drug flow and the money trail “all converge on the Champhai-Zokhawthar corridor”.

This is a narcotics case, not a scam case, and it should be described as such. Yet both businesses thrive in similar territory. The scam side is large. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that at least 120,000 people are thought to be trapped in scam compounds in Myanmar, and a rights group reports more than 5,300 people still held near the Thai border. The International Institute for Strategic Studies puts annual losses at up to US$37 billion across East and Southeast Asia and warns that scam centres “pose a national-security threat and a growing risk to sovereignty”.

The strongest reason for concern is that crackdowns move operations rather than end them. After the military’s raid on KK Park in late 2025, satellite analysis by C4ADS found that 14 of 21 known compounds in Myawaddy Township had shown construction or expansion since January. Jason Tower of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime was blunt: “There’s no real political will to crack down,” he said. As one commentator puts it, a crackdown that displaces a business without ending it “is a relocation notice”.

India’s exposure is also human. The Ministry of External Affairs says it has repatriated more than 2,400 citizens from Myanmar’s compounds, and that around 150 remain trapped. In a single airlift from Thailand, India brought home 270 nationals, including 26 women, who had allegedly escaped compounds across the border.

The strongest objection is geographical, and it deserves a direct answer. The best-documented hubs sit in Karen State near the Thai border and in Shan State near China, not on India’s frontier. Repatriated Indians were brought to India via Thailand’s Mae Sot, and they came from several states, not only the Northeast. Recruitment is national and online. The figures are also unsettled: reports of 5,000 Indians trapped in Myanmar were not confirmed by the government. An argument that compounds already operate in the Northeast would overstate what the record shows.

Dismissing the Northeast risk would be a mistake too. The border is porous. Only 30 km of its 1,624-kilometre length had been fenced by September 2024, and the government ended the Free Movement Regime in February 2024 amid concern about “rampant illegal cross-border activities”. Mule accounts and hawala channels flourish where the state is thin.

The response should follow the money. The ED’s case shows cash flowing into Champhai from accounts in New Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai, so this chain reaches well beyond the border. Financial intelligence should be linked directly to trafficking investigations, and recruiters operating inside India should be pursued. Diplomacy matters, but it has limits. As one ThePrint commentary argues, an assistance request “achieves little because the receiving state cannot enter the compound, as is the case of Myanmar”. That commentary’s conclusion is that “What India needs now is a digital neighbourhood policy.” Policy must also distinguish between people who knew what work they were taking and people who were trafficked.

A single bank account in Champhai does not make a scam compound. But it shows that the money has already crossed the frontier. The compounds may still sit on the far side of it. The money is already on this side, and that is where India can act first.

  • Brigadier Ranjit Borthakur, Sena Medal (Retd.)

    Brigadier Ranjit Borthakur, Sena Medal, is an alumnus of Sainik School, Goalpara (Assam). He joined the National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla (Pune) in 1973 and was commissioned into the Garhwal Rifles from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun, in 1977. In 1984, he transferred to the Military Intelligence Corps, where he commanded an intelligence unit during active counter-insurgency operations in the Northeast and served in counter-terrorism operations in the Kashmir Valley. He retired from the Defence Services in 2012. Following his military career, Brig. Borthakur was appointed as a Member of the Assam Public Service Commission (APSC) and later served as Chairman (in charge) until his retirement in 2017. Now settled in Guwahati, Assam, he is a regular television panelist and contributes articles in both English and vernacular newspapers on contemporary issues.

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