Europe’s spies are learning to live without American guarantees


Robert Dover is a professor of intelligence and national security and dean of the Hull University Business School.

Whether navigating reports of paused US intelligence sharing with Ukraine or diplomatic rows over attacks on Russian infrastructure, European officials face growing uncertainty under the US security umbrella [1]. While core intelligence capabilities and counterterrorism cooperation remain active, Washington’s support has become increasingly transactional and politicized, particularly regarding Russia. This conditional guarantee creates a uniquely challenging planning environment for European governments, raising the central question of whether Europe aspires to be a middle power or a power caught in the middle of the US and China.

Europe’s global shift

European intelligence services face three new challenges that are being experienced across the world. First is a change in tradecraft: most intelligence activity was once about avoiding surprise and knowing secrets, but now it is as much about disrupting espionage and threats in the field against a wide range of hostile actors, including states, organizations, and motivated individuals. Britain’s MI6 has publicly announced a more assertive disposition [2]. Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) has made similar pledges, pairing technical collection with “intelligence diplomacy.” For the MIT, this has included acting as an intermediary in Gaza ceasefire talks, showing how intelligence agencies are becoming more influential [3].

A second shift is occurring in security innovation, moving from state monopolies to commercial suppliers. Satellite imagery, data analytics, and artificial intelligence were once only possible for strong intelligence powers, but innovation is now far more likely to occur in the private sector, and in Silicon Valley in particular. While this concentration of innovation gives middle powers potentially greater access to high-end capabilities, it also creates the problem of being overly dependent on politically influenced US commercial supply chains.

Lastly, there is a shift from alliances to transactional coalitions, with the sharing of intelligence and assets increasingly done on a case-by-case basis. The Trump administration is not the first to do this, but it is doing so more assertively than its predecessors. America’s allies are already recalculating what they can rely on the US for.

Cold War relics

Europe’s intelligence infrastructure is still dependent on the United States. The Five Eyes intelligence partnership excludes continental Europe from its main membership but does retain links with many European intelligence agencies. An estimated 85% of intelligence that comes into the Five Eyes is American in origin, suggesting that European powers will have to dramatically scale their efforts to redress this balance. Europe lacks its own missile early-warning satellites and relies heavily on American cloud computing and software platforms, including the new frontier AI models that the president has been keen to demonstrate he can prevent from being utilized outside of America [4]. The contest for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is being fought between America and China [5]. The potential for societal control, increased productivity, and military applications has given this an existential feel. Europe has failed to generate and deploy the capital to compete seriously on frontier models, leaving it caught between two AI superpowers; this is a mistake.

At the time of writing, EU institutions are mostly building capabilities in intelligence analysis rather than collection, save for European space capabilities like ICEYE, even if US rockets are required to deploy them. A Security College Secretariat began work inside the European Commission on Sept. 1, but collecting intelligence remains, for the moment, a national competence under the EU treaties [6]. Former Finnish President Sauli Niinisto, who proposed an EU intelligence service, concedes that collection will require further negotiations between member states [7].

Developing a Plan B

Europe’s first response has been to mirror the Americans and to be more cautious in sharing. In October 2025, the Dutch agencies (AIVD and MIVD) acknowledged that they increasingly assess intelligence independently—and sometimes withhold information from the US [8]. The Dutch also noted a sharp increase in their intelligence sharing with British, German, Nordic, French and Polish services. In December 2025, Denmark’s military intelligence service wrote that the United States was contemplating military force against allies. Within weeks, Trump’s threats against Greenland confirmed the Danish assessment.

The US has changed its disposition towards Europe. In May 2026, the Pentagon announced a drawdown of 5,000 troops from Germany, and its posture review recommended a further withdrawal of 25,000 to 40,000 of the roughly 80,000 US personnel in Europe [9]. Conversely, the US is negotiating a new permanent base in Poland. Cooperation is therefore becoming selective; the US is both rewarding and punishing allies. European nations are mirroring this approach by building European layers of security coverage underneath the traditional American-underwritten system.

European intelligence agencies have switched to offensive operations. On Aug. 12, the German government approved plans that allow the BND to penetrate and disable foreign IT systems during an attack on Germany and give the domestic BfV operational powers for the first time [10]. The aftermath of World War II had seen German intelligence and security services barred from this range of activities, and attempts to reintroduce them have created political and constitutional challenges.

The German government’s moves are a response to Russia’s campaign of below-threshold warfare, including arson, sabotage, threats to defense leaders, cyberattacks, drones over airports, and damage to undersea cables. A US Congressional Research Service report noted that Russian hybrid attacks in Europe quadrupled between 2023 and 2024 [11]. How Europe responds to this increased risk while maintaining its democratic protections is an ongoing question.

Turkish balance

Türkiye has long managed conditional relationships with East and West, offering valuable experience as Europe faces similar dynamics with the US. Hosting NATO’s second-largest army, controlling Black Sea access, and housing the Kurecik radar, Türkiye provides critical early warning and strategic military depth.

While supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, Ankara maintains diplomatic and economic ties with Moscow. Incorporating Türkiye into EU security dialogues and defense initiatives like the €150 billion SAFE instrument would significantly bolster Europe’s broader security posture [12].

Fear as a driver of reform

The transformation of European intelligence and security is uneven because the fear necessary to generate reform is unevenly experienced across the continent. For Poland, the Baltic states, and the Nordic countries, the threat from Russia is immediate, and their historical experience with Russia is fraught. These nations are sharing intelligence, warnings, and assets most aggressively and trying to push the rest of Europe into doing the same. Der Spiegel has called Poland a proving ground for Russian sabotage, noting that any Russian incursion into NATO territory would likely begin there [13]. Germany has faced sabotage at its airports and threats against its defense leaders [14]. Denmark faces a complex dual anxiety: Russia in the Baltic and America in the Arctic. Britain sits in between: inside the Five Eyes, leaning further into Europe, but strained by the Iran war and distracted by the withdrawal of US bombers from RAF Fairford.

Southern Europe has not faced the same level of sabotage. While their publics largely support Ukraine, most do not see Russia as an imminent threat. When reports emerged in September 2026 of a CIA warning about ship-launched Russian drones aimed at Spain, France or Italy, Italy’s defense minister called the alarm unsubstantiated. Southern EU nations are more concerned about Libya, migration, and the Middle East.

Still no European CIA, no Euro-Army

Europe has been unable to create its own unified army, security, and intelligence apparatus. What Europe is building is still a network of national services that are operationally focused and bound by coalitions of trust rather than formal Brussels processes. These coalitions remain heavily dependent on US government and US private-sector assets, whilst knowing they can no longer rely upon Washington. Any steps taken toward finding the collective will to build independent capabilities reduce the risk and dependency on one superpower. While these capabilities will need political cohesion and more investment, the challenge is that if Russia becomes even more disruptive in continental Europe, it will be too late to act.

[1] https://edition.cnn.com/2026/10/11/politics/ukraine-us-weapons-intelligence

[2] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-by-blaise-metreweli-chief-of-sis-15-december-2025

[3] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260804-turkish-intelligence-chief-meets-hamas-delegation-in-istanbul/

[4] https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/us-reverses-course-britains-testing-ai-models-telegraph-says-2026-10-11/

[5] https://cloud.google.com/discover/what-is-artificial-general-intelligence

[6] https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/13914/40/european-commission-sets-up-security-college-secretariat-within-its-secretariat-general-headed-by-ilkka-salmi

[7] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-this-former-finnish-president-wants-a-new-european-spy-agency/

[8] https://nltimes.nl/2025/10/18/dutch-intelligence-services-cut-back-sharing-information-us

[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-withdrawing-5000-troops-germany-us-officials-say-2026-05-01/

[10] https://www.reuters.com/technology/germany-seeks-powers-spies-hack-disrupt-attackers-2026-07-02/

[11] https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R49134

[12] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/eu-borrower-investor-relations/safe_en

[13] https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/7785/artykul/3729142,der-spiegel-poland-has-become-testing-ground-for-russian-hybrid-warfare

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/german-police-investigate-fence-breach-leipzig-airport-2026-10-18/

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.



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