After holding highly controversial elections in December 2025 and January 2026, Min Aung Hlaing, the former head of Myanmar’s military junta and now the country’s president, began to make official visits to neighboring countries. Economic diplomacy has been a key theme in nearly all his visits, particularly to China, Thailand, and Malaysia, where he traveled with representatives of Myanmar’s leading business conglomerates.
These visits comprised trade negotiations, investment promotion and business meetings, suggesting an effort to strengthen an economy that has weakened dramatically since the military coup of 2021. Yet the regime’s domestic economic policies continue to obstruct the economic cooperation efforts Myanmar wishes to encourage. Without addressing these contradictions – between overseas commitments and domestic restrictions – the regime’s economic diplomacy is unlikely to lead to a national economic recovery.
These contradictions are rooted in the interests of powerful domestic interest groups. In Myanmar, political authorities and business elites formed a small coalition that controls access to trade and investment. Therefore, their interests in maintaining restrictions on imports, foreign currency, and trade revenues sustain domestic restrictions that undermine the regime’s implementation of foreign economic commitments.
Myanmar’s precarious post-coup economic conditions and ongoing conflicts have further compounded these political constraints and undermined its ability to deliver on trade commitments. Therefore, the regime’s ongoing efforts to expand economic relations with neighboring countries should be analyzed in light of its continued reliance on domestic economic controls.
While visiting China from June 15 to 19, Min Aung Hlaing and China’s leader Xi Jinping agreed to accelerate ongoing China–Myanmar Economic Corridor projects and to enhance bilateral trade through yuan–kyat settlements. During his subsequent visit to Thailand on August 6-7, Min Aung Hlaing and Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul agreed to strengthen bilateral trade relations, setting a $12 billion bilateral trade target (albeit without a timeline). Both sides also agreed to ease existing regulatory barriers and facilitate cross-border trade. Meanwhile, during the Malaysia-Myanmar economic dialogue in Kuala Lumpur on October 7, Min Aung Hlaing also called for investment from Malaysian companies in Myanmar, particularly in food processing, manufacturing, logistics, and special economic zones.
Implementing these proposals would require businesses to obtain foreign currency in order to import machinery and raw materials from overseas. In reality, the regime still heavily regulates imports and foreign currency, and imposes import restrictions to maintain depleted foreign currency reserves. Such regulatory measures would therefore hinder the implementation of agreed trade and investment commitments.
Another key issue that would complicate overseas commitments is Myanmar’s weakened economic position. After the 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s economy experienced a sharp decline due to exacerbated conflict, fresh sanctions, and the collapse of investor confidence. The World Bank’s June 2026 Economic Monitor on Myanmar estimated a 2 percent contraction in the economy compared to the previous fiscal year, with an inflation rate of 24.6 per cent in April 2026. This assessment also reflected the government’s heavy administrative burden and uneven policy implementation. Although some economic activities have begun to stabilize, the World Bank noted that many businesses continue to face electricity shortages, weak demand and rising production costs amid the ongoing conflict and the 2025 earthquake. Under these circumstances, businesses focus more on survival than on expansion. Such conditions have established a difficult operating environment for international investors.
Despite its commitments to economic cooperation and strengthening trade ties, the regime continues to restrict the trade it has promised to facilitate. The March 2026 U.S. International Trade Administration’s commercial guide highlights the unpredictable import license approvals and non-automatic licensing for border trade. Shortly after Min Aung Hlaing visited Thailand, Myanmar authorities stalled shipments of frozen food and other imports from the Tachilek-Mae Sai Border on September 21, reportedly citing standards checks and unpaid taxes. These restrictions disrupted border commerce, caused congested traffic, and led to the accumulation of commodities at the border. This disruption illustrates the difficulties of implementing bilateral trade commitments amid unpredictable domestic trade policies and enforcement.
Similar restrictions on border trade are also happening at the China-Myanmar border. Although China recently eased restrictions at some crossings controlled by ethnic armed organizations, the imports face serious challenges in accessing Myanmar’s domestic markets. Since August, the military and combined departmental teams have tightened border trade, hindering the informal flow of imports to the domestic market. Such obstructions undermine the border trade the regime seeks to promote with China and increase uncertainty for businesses regarding imported supplies.
Political motivations behind such restrictions have become evident recently. After Operation 1027, an offensive launched by key ethnic armed groups in late 2023, most of the border trade routes and key trading facilities along the China-Myanmar border fell under the control of the ethnic armed organizations. On October 28, Min Aung Hlaing called for action against the ongoing informal border trade, citing its role in strengthening the capabilities of armed groups. His remark also highlights the importance of border trade in Myanmar’s ongoing civil war, and the fact that such restrictions serve military and revenue objectives alongside foreign exchange management. Therefore, the facilitation of trade outside of Naypyidaw’s control contradicts its efforts to deny resources to armed opponents.
The restrictive measures on border trade and imports also align with the interests of Myanmar’s domestic economic elites. Since 2021, the regime has tightened control over imports and foreign currency, leaving many businesses to rely on administrative approvals for commercial activities. Importers now face license-approval limits, uncertain waiting periods, and payment restrictions. In this permit economy, access to official permissions has become a commercial advantage and a key means of securing access to supplies and markets. Traders told The Irrawaddy that import licenses for the reopening of the Thai-Myanmar border trade in June 2026 were awarded through a patronage network controlled by Vice-President Nyo Saw, who is also responsible for approving the use of foreign currency. For business elites benefiting from current restrictions and controlling a monopoly on imports, easing restrictions could bring greater competition and reduce their advantages. Such elites may seek foreign partnerships while retaining domestic control and limiting expectations of broader economic gains through overseas commitments.
Despite restrictive policies, crafting close economic relations with neighboring countries may create new trade and investment opportunities for certain businesses. Myanmar’s policymakers should implement predictable and transparent import licensing criteria, consistent approval timelines, and eased foreign currency restrictions. Such measures would help to realize the overseas trade commitments agreed in recent months. Meanwhile, neighboring counterparts should push the implementation of agreed commitments to improve firms’ ability to purchase supplies, make foreign currency payments, and deliver goods to domestic markets.
However, prospects for trade normalization and economic recovery remain uncertain. Such outcomes depend on the regime’s political will and ability to reconcile its economic commitments with domestic elite interests and security priorities. Ongoing trade restrictions are still obstructing revenue to armed opponents and preserving advantages for well-connected business elites. Under such circumstances, administrative reforms alone are unlikely to overcome the political interests influencing ongoing trade restrictions. Therefore, durable political progress that addresses the ongoing political crisis and competing control over trade routes is necessary for trade normalization and economic recovery.